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A B S T R A C T   
Given the widespread concern but general lack of information over the possibility of SARS-CoV-2 infection in 
public transport, key issues such as passenger personal hygiene, efficient air circulation systems, and the effective 
disinfection of frequently touched surfaces need to be evaluated to educate the public and diminish the risk of 
viral transmission as we learn to live with the ongoing pandemic. In this context we report on a study involving 
the collection of 99 samples taken from inside Barcelona buses and subway trains in May to July 2020. From this 
sample group 82 (58 surface swabs, 9 air conditioning (a/c) filters, 3 a/c dust, 12 ambient air) were selected to be 
analysed by RT-PCR for traces of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Thirty of these selected samples showed evidence for one 
or more of 3 target RNA gene regions specific for this virus (IP2, IP4, E). Most (24) of these 30 samples showed 
positivity for only 1 of the 3 RNA targets, 4 samples yielded 2 targets, and 2 samples provided evidence for all 3 
targets. RNA remnants were more common in surface swabs from support bars (23 out of 58) than in ambient air 
inside the vehicles (3 out of 12), with relatively higher concentrations of viral RNA fragments in buses rather 
than in trains. Whereas subway train a/c filters examined were all virus-free, 4 of the 9 bus a/c filter/dust 
samples yielded evidence for viral RNA. After nocturnal maintenance and cleaning most buses initially yielding 
positive results subsequently showed elimination of the RT-PCR signal, although signs of viral RNA remained in 4 
of 13 initially positive samples. The presence of such remnant viral traces however does not demonstrate 
infectivity, which in the present study is considered unlikely given the fragmentary nature of the gene targets 
detected. Nevertheless, best practice demands that close attention to ventilation systems and regular vehicle 
disinfection in public transport worldwide need to be rigorously applied to be effective at eliminating traces of 
the virus throughout the vehicle, especially at times when COVID-19 cases are peaking. Additionally, infectivity 
tests should be implemented to evaluate the efficiency of disinfection procedures to complement the information 
resulting from RT-PCR analysis. Modelling the probability of infection whilst travelling in buses under different 
scenarios indicates that forced ventilation greatly reduces the risk.   
1. Introduction 
The possibility of SARS-CoV-2 infection while travelling in public 
transport is an obvious concern for the millions of commuters around the 
world using this transportation means. As the current COVID-19 
pandemic spread across the world this concern has led to many people 
choosing to avoid public transportation systems, which consequently 
have been hit especially hard (Tan and Ma, 2020; Tirachini and Cats, 
2020). Those in favour of using public transportation and its environ-
mental benefits emphasise the likely efficacy of current protocols on 
mask wearing, personal hygiene, improved ventilation and avoiding 
rush hour travel, and argue that available data on COVID-19 clusters 
suggest the risk of infection in such transport microenvironments is 
relatively low (Normile, 2020; Sadik-Khan and Solomonow, 2020; Santé 
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Publique France, 2020). To date, however, published scientific evidence 
related to possible COVID-19 transmission on city buses, trams and 
subways is very limited. 
Our understanding of the spread of COVID-19 in public trans-
portation is based on the knowledge that the most important routes for 
the transmission of respiratory viral diseases are via small airborne 
micro-droplets (aerosols), larger respiratory droplets (which fall close to 
where they are expired), and through contact with contaminated sur-
faces (fomites) (Jones, 2020; Morawska et al., 2020; Ren et al., 2020; 
Yao et al., 2020). After initial focus on the role of fomites and larger 
droplets, aerosol transmission of the disease is now increasingly recog-
nised to be important (e.g. Miller et al., 2020; Morawska and Milton, 
2020). In a report published in July 2020 the World Health Organisation 
moved forward in its recognition of the likely role of aerosols in 
spreading COVID-19, concluding that Current evidence suggests that the 
main way the virus spreads is by respiratory droplets among people who are in 
close contact with each other. Aerosol transmission can occur in specific 
settings, particularly in indoor, crowded and inadequately ventilated spaces, 
where infected person(s) spend long periods of time with others, such as 
restaurants, choir practices, fitness classes, nightclubs, offices and/or places 
of worship (WHO 2020a). 
When a person harbouring SARS-CoV-2 is breathing, speaking, 
shouting, sneezing or coughing, potentially infectious particles are 
emitted into the surrounding atmosphere (Allen and Marr, 2020). These 
particles can remain suspended for hours, with complex movements and 
thermodynamic transformations (e.g. dehydration and evaporation) 
affecting the droplets as soon as they are emitted depending on factors 
such as air flow, temperature and humidity. It has been shown that 
SARS-CoV-2 present in experimentally-generated aerosols can remain 
biologically active in the air for 3 h (van Doremalen et al., 2020), and 
possibly considerably more (Fears et al., 2020; Moriarty et al., 2020). 
Likewise, it is known that SARS-CoV-2 can remain viable for hours or 
even days after its deposition on surfaces (Bar-On et al., 2020; Biryukov 
et al., 2020; Chin et al., 2020; Ren et al., 2020). However, it is important 
to emphasise that the presence of fragments of the viral genome able to 
yield positive RT-PCR signals is not an indication of the occurrence of 
infectious viruses. In this context, despite RNA SARS-CoV-2 traces 
having been detected in outdoor air in routine surveillance of air quality, 
sampling industrial and urban background atmospheric particulate 
matter (PM), their infectivity was not tested so that it remains unclear 
whether they were biologically viable (Setti et al., 2020). Of particular 
relevance here is the fact that outdoor exposure to UV light works to 
inactivate the virus. Decay rates in simulated saliva, under simulated 
sunlight levels representative of late winter/early fall and summer have 
been reported as 0.121 ± 0.017 min− 1 (90% loss: 19 min) and 0.379 ±
0.072 min− 1 (90% loss: 6 min), respectively (Schuit et al., 2020). Thus 
the extrapolation of data produced from artificially-generated aerosols 
to actual-life transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 infection needs to be 
interpreted carefully. 
Most of the relevant studies on the current pandemic published to 
date have reported on the presence of the virus within hospitals. In such 
environments nosocomial transmission is known to have taken place 
because SARS-CoV-2 can be widely distributed both in fomites (that is, 
any passive vector capable of contaminating and transmitting the dis-
ease) and in air (e.g. Guo et al., 2020; Jiang et al., 2020; Kampf et al., 
2020; Liu et al., 2020; Ong et al., 2020; Rahmani et al., 2020; Som-
merstein et al., 2020; Tran et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2020; Morawska and 
Milton, 2020). Particularly implicated in contamination on surfaces in 
hospital rooms are floors, air vents, bedrails, bathroom areas, patient 
masks, hand sanitizer dispensers, door handles and personal protective 
equipment (Chia et al., 2020; Guo et al., 2020; Razzini et al., 2020; 
Hirota, 2020). Viruses deposited on these surfaces have the potential to 
be picked up by susceptible persons touching these surfaces. They also 
have the potential to be resuspended in the air, adding an additional 
complicating factor to the challenge of preventing their transmission, 
and emphasising the importance of cleaning protocols. Airborne virus 
can be inhaled and cause infection if the dose is high enough. 
Regarding urban public transport settings by road, rail and air, 
although there is little scientific evidence on relevant contributions to 
the total SARS-CoV-2 infections, it is reasonable to assume that crowd-
ing, poor air circulation, and/or lack of sanitation and personal pro-
tection in these environments will increase the risk of microbial 
infection (Coleman et al., 2018; Furuya, 2007; Goscé and Johansson, 
2018; Ikonen et al., 2018; Lei et al., 2018; Morawska and Cao, 2020; 
Morawska and Milton, 2020; Musselwhite et al., 2020; Nishiura et al., 
2020; Qian et al., 2020). This is well demonstrated by a case of COVID- 
19 infection between private bus passengers during a day trip to a 
religious event in January 2020 (Shen et al., 2020), although this 
occurred just before widespread pandemic awareness and so the pas-
sengers travelled unprotected by masks or disinfection measures. By 
now, however, the entire human population is well aware of the prob-
lem and attention has inevitably turned to the possibility of transmission 
of COVID-19 due to the proximity of passengers even wearing masks 
passing on the infection during crowding and sometimes prolonged time 
inhalation exposure (Lou et al., 2020), thus highlighting the importance 
of ventilation systems, personal hygiene, and effective disinfection of 
frequently contacted surfaces (Morawska et al., 2020; SAGE, 2020). 
Mechanical escalator handrails for example are known to be capable of 
carrying a high microbial load and can therefore be the focus of path-
ogen transmission (Afshinnekoo et al., 2015), and similar arguments 
presumably apply to the bars, buttons and handles in public transport 
vehicles which are regularly touched by passengers. Obvious ways of 
reducing the risk of infection in the closed spaces typical of public 
transport vehicles involve increasing the ventilation (uptake of external 
air, Morawska et al., 2020), developing best practice disinfection pro-
tocols, and insisting on personal mask protection (Chu et al., 2020; Dzisi 
and Dei, 2020, Eikenberry et al., 2020; Greenhalgh et al., 2020; Javid 
et al., 2020; Leung et al., 2020; Prather et al., 2020). Such improved 
hygiene practices are already widely employed in our city transport 
systems (e.g. Iolov, 2020) but would benefit from scientific information 
on the presence or otherwise of viral traces within these public vehicles. 
In this paper therefore we present the results of a study carried out 
from May to July 2020 in public buses and subway trains in the city of 
Barcelona, Spain, specifically looking for the presence of traces of SARS- 
CoV-2 RNA on surfaces, in the air, and in the air conditioning systems. 
The samples from buses included collecting before and after the 
nocturnal maintenance period. Additionally, we have modelled the ef-
fect of increasing ventilation rate inside a bus in reducing the individual 
infection risk. The study provides an example of a close collaborative 
effort between academic research teams working together with the local 
transport company to produce peer-reviewed scientific data published 
and freely available as an open access paper. 
2. Methodology 
The study involved a total of 75 samples from buses and 24 from 
subway trains, collected from surfaces using swabs (78 samples), from 
ambient air (12 samples), and from air-conditioning filters (9 samples). 
In the case of the buses, the sampling was done in the bus depot in the 
early morning before (Sample Group A) and after (Sample Group B) the 
night time maintenance period, which included cleaning operations 
using bleach or ozone (O3), whereas subway sampling was done during 
late working hours. The samples were then analyzed for the occurrence 
of SARS-CoV-2 RNA. 
2.1. Subway 
Sampling of surfaces inside carriages of 15 subway trains took place 
on the night of June 11, 2020 between 21:00 and 22:15 at the end of 
lines 1, 3 and 5 (L1, L3 and L5, Table S1), as chosen by Transports 
Metropolitans of Barcelona (TMB) for the study. The sampling was 
carried out in the first (front) carriage after the train had been vacated 
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by passengers and was in the process of changing tracks for the return 
journey. Polyester swabs (ref 300265, Deltalab, Barcelona) were used to 
sample all the vertical support bars in the carriage. Around 300 cm2 
located around 1.00–1.25 m from the floor (a height deduced to be an 
area of maximum hand contact by passengers, Fig. 1a) were scrubbed 
per bar. In addition, on L3, where door opening is manual, door handles 
(around 25 cm2) were also sampled. Swabs were immediately placed in 
tubes with 1 ml of transport medium (ref 304103, Deltalab). 
Air sampling in the subway took place the following week (June 
17–19, 2020) in lines L1, L3, and L5 on three consecutive days. Six 
samples of particulate matter with a diameter of<2.5 µm (PM2.5) were 
collected inside 6 trains using 47 mm Teflon filters with PEM (Personal 
Environmental Monitor) equipment (Table S1). The instruments oper-
ated at 10 L/min with Leland pumps placed inside the driver’s cabin and 
connected to filters placed above the closed access door to the driver 
area on the passenger side (Fig. 1b). Sampling was carried out simul-
taneously on two trains on the same line for 9–10 h of train running 
(Table S1). Finally, TMB supplied three samples of 3 air conditioning 
filters (one of which had been treated with a virucidal agent before 
testing) used in wagons of the same lines (L1, L3 and L5). 
2.2. Buses 
The sampling of the buses for the possible presence of SARS-CoV-2 
took place between 20:00 and 03:00 on the night of May 25–26, 2020 
in one of the four main bus depots in Barcelona. For the sampling per-
formed before the nightly maintenance and cleaning, polyester swabs 
were wiped across the left side of call buttons (around 10 cm2) and 
plastic/aluminium holding bars (250 cm2, 20 cm above and below each 
call button: Samples A Fig. 1c). After sampling, the bus was driven away 
for maintenance and disinfection, a procedure that in most cases took 
between 2 and 5 h. The disinfection was done using either bleach 
(manual cleaning with 5% sodium hypochlorite) or ozone (O3 cannon 
inside closed bus for 20 min). In the latter case, O3 concentrations, in the 
range of 1 to 1000 ppb (2 to 2000 µg/m3) were measured, using POM 
instruments (2B-USA, based on ultraviolet radiation absorption method) 
in five buses. After each bus had been cleaned and prepared, the sam-
pling procedure was repeated but on the right side of the same call 
buttons and bars (Samples B). Table S1 summarises the sample numbers, 
timings and type of disinfection applied. 
With regard to the O3 disinfection procedures, an in-vitro study to test 
the inactivation capacity of different O3 treatments using a surrogate for 
SARS-CoV-2 (Coronavirus 229E, hereinafter CoV 229E) on bus bar 
surfaces was also performed. To this end bus bars were removed from 
Fig. 1. Sampling locations in the subway train surfaces (a) and air (b), and buses surfaces (c) and air (d).  
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the buses and transported to the Enteric Virus Laboratory facilities and 
100 µl of a viral suspension of CoV 229E (105 TCID50) was spiked on 
each of nine surface (around 5 cm2) in a BSL-2 cabinet. After allowing 
the suspension to dry for 30 min, 3 untreated control samples were left 
standing aside, and O3 treatments of 300 and 600 ppb for 20 min at 60% 
relative humidity were each applied to 3 experimental surfaces. O3 
concentrations were monitored using a POM O3 monitor (2B Technol-
ogies). After the O3 treatments, the virus was recovered from untreated 
and treated surfaces using swabs which were subsequently placed in 
tubes with 1 ml of transport medium for infectivity determination. 
Additionally, three samples from each air conditioning (a/c) filter in 
six buses were collected. In three of these six buses, samples of dust from 
immediately behind the a/c filter were also collected (Table S1). 
Finally, ambient air particles (PM2.5) were collected during the entire 
bus work day from further six buses operating on the June 3 to 5, 2020 
(two buses per day; routes selected by TMB) using the same protocol 
described to this end for the subway (Fig. 1d, Table S1). 
2.3. Real-Time RT-qPCR 
Virus detection on surfaces was carried out by analysing the presence 
of viral RNA with Real-Time Reverse-Transcription PCR (Real-Time RT- 
qPCR) using three target gene regions: two targets from the RNA- 
dependent RNA polymerase (IP2 and IP4 designed by Institute Pas-
teur; Protocol: Real-time RT-PCR assays for the detection of SARS-CoV- 
2: WHO 2020b) and a fragment from the envelope gene (E designed by 
Charité, Berlin; Schoeman and Fielding 2019; Corman et al., 2020). 
Three one-step RT-qPCR assays were performed using the RNA Ultra-
Sense™ One-Step Quantitative RT-PCR System (Invitrogen, Life Tech-
nologies). The standard curve was constructed using the Twist Synthetic 
SARS-CoV-2 RNA Control 2 (MN908947.3) (Twist Bioscience) and their 
parameters are shown in Table S2 of the Supplementary Information. 
Quality control and quality assurance were ascertained using nega-
tive and positive controls to determine any potential contamination 
and/or inhibition, respectively. The positive controls consisted of the 
addition of two distilled water samples containing 5x103 copies of the 
Twist RNA, which were run in parallel in each RT-PCR plate. Addi-
tionally, all samples were assayed undiluted and diluted 1/10 to further 
elucidate the action of inhibitors, which in the 1/10 dilution usually 
disappears. The negative controls comprised five distilled water samples 
per run: two from the beginning of the assay, to control any potential 
contamination during the RNA extraction, and three in the RT-PCR, to 
control any potential contamination during nucleic acids amplification. 
Two or three strongly positive target regions suggest a relatively 
abundant and/or relatively recent virus contamination, whereas a single 
positive target indicates weak contamination. In whichever case, how-
ever, none of the RT-PCR results prove infectivity, since only fragments 
of the genome are detected. With regard to the bus surface samples, in 
group B only those that gave a positive result in group A (before 
cleaning) were subjected to PCR analysis. 
2.4. Infectivity assays 
Infectious CoV 229E numbers were determined after infecting Huh- 
7AI cell monolayers (Pinto et al., 2018) as TCID50 units (50% tissue 
culture infectious dose in 96 well multiplates (Costafreda et al., 2014). 
All titrations of untreated (3) and treated (6) samples were performed in 
duplicate. Ninety-six well multiplates were used, with an inoculum of 
20 µl / well, at a rate of 8 replicates per dilution, following a 1/5 dilution 
series. Cells inoculated with culture medium were used as “negative 
controls”. Each titration had its corresponding “positive control”, spe-
cifically cells inoculated with a viral suspension of CoV 229E of known 
titer. The formula used to calculate the TCID50 was applied following the 
SOP 0,350,300 DAD/001 of the Enteric Virus Group of the Department 
of Genetics, Microbiology and Statistics from the University of 
Barcelona. 
2.5. Modelling of the risks of potential infection by increasing ventilation 
rate in a bus 
In the prospective assessment of the individual infection risk and the 
basic reproduction number for bus commuters due to the airborne 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in the presence of a SARS-CoV-2 infected 
subject without wearing a mask the following methodology was 
adopted:  
- Definition of different exposure scenarios (in terms of bus geometry, 
ventilation, number of commuters, activity levels and inhalation 
rates of the commuters). The exposure scenarios considered in the 
assessment are summarized in Table 1:  
- Calculation of the probability of infection and the basic reproduction 
number starting from the quanta emission rates estimated by Buo-
nanno et al. (2020a).  
- Calculation of the individual infection risk. 
The following definitions should be considered:  
- Probability of infection (PI) = ratio between infected cases (C) and 
the number of susceptible subject exposed (S): PI = C/S.  
- Basic reproduction number (R0) = ratio between the number of 
infected cases (C) and the number of infected subject (I): R0 = C/I.  
- Individual infection risk (R(ERq)) = risk of an exposed subject to be 
infected as it takes into account how likely the calculated probability 
of infection occurs, i.e. how likely the rate of quanta emitted by the 
infected subject occurs: R(ERq) = PI(ERq)⋅PERq. For the purposes of 
this report, a value of R < 0.1% will be considered acceptable.  
- PERq = probability of occurrence of a certain rate of quanta (ERq) 
emitted by the infected subject. 
Thus, in order to calculate the probability of infection and, then, the 
individual infection risk, a Monte Carlo simulation taking into account 
all possible emission rates of the infected subject should be run as 
described in Buonanno et al. (2020b). The authors point out that the 
quanta emission rate is a key parameter to evaluate the individual 
infection risk. The quanta emission rates here considered were calcu-
lated on the basis of a novel approach proposed in a previous paper 
(Buonanno et al., 2020a) which allows the estimation of the quanta 
emission rate of SARS-CoV-2 as a function of different viral loads, 
infectivity, respiratory activities, and activity levels. This approach 
represented an important step forward in the scientific literature, 
because until this advance simplified backward calculations were used 
to estimate the emission of an infected subject based on retrospective 
assessments of infectious outbreaks only at the end of an epidemic (Dai 
and Zhao, 2020). A simplified estimate of R (instead of the Monte Carlo 
method) can be carried out adopting the ERq value assumed with a 
probability of occurrence PERq = 1 and inducing a PI(ERq) equal to the 
risk R evaluated through the Monte Carlo method. Such emission rate at 
PERq = 1 resulted as the ERq at the 66th percentile (Buonanno et al., 
2020b). Thus, adopting such simplified calculation (ERq at 66th 
percentile), the probability of infection matches the individual risk. 
The a-priori (prospective) assessment of the probability of infection 
was performed considering the following steps:  
• calculation of the quanta concentration n(t) in the bus through the 
equation: 





1 − e− IVRR∙t
)(
quanta/m3)
where IVRR (h− 1) represents the infectious virus removal rate in the 
space investigated, n0 represents the initial quanta concentration in the 
bus, I is the number of infectious subjects (1 in our simulations), V is the 
volume of the buses considered, and ERq is the quanta emission rate, 
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66th percentile, (quanta/h) of the SARS-CoV-2 infected subject. The 
quanta concentration calculation adopted here is based on the following 
hypotheses: the quanta emission rate is considered to be constant, the 
latent period of the disease is longer than the time scale of the model, 
and the emitted particles are instantaneously and evenly distributed in 
the room (Gammaitoni and Nucci, 1997). The infectious virus removal 
rate, IVRR, is the sum of three contributions (Yang and Marr, 2011): the 
air exchange rate (AER) via ventilation, the particle deposition on sur-
faces (k, e.g. via gravitational settling), and the viral inactivation (λ). 
The deposition rate was evaluated as the ratio between the settling ve-
locity of super-micrometric particles (roughly 1.0 × 10-4 m/s as 
measured by Chatoutsidou and Lazaridis, 2019) and the height of the 
emission source (1.5 m); thus, k was 0.24/h. The viral inactivation was 
evaluated on the basis of the SARS-CoV-2 half-life (1.1 h) detected by 
(van Doremalen et al., 2020), thus λ was 0.63/h. As regards the quanta 
emission rate (ERq), for each scenario, two sub-scenarios were tested 
considering two different expiratory activities while standing: a): 
speaking (66th percentile equal to 3.8 quanta/h), b) oral breathing 
(66th percentile equal to 0.8 quanta/h).  





where T is the total exposure time of the exposed subjects and IR is their 
inhalation rate (IR) which is affected by their activity level (here 
considered IR = 0.54 m3/h for oral breathing while standing)  
• evaluation of the probability of infection through a well-known 
exponential dose–response model: 
PI = 1 − e− Dq (%)
3. Results 
3.1. Subway samples 
Of a total of 15 swab surface samples, 6 gave a positive RT-qPCR 
signal (Table 2), but for only one of the 3 targets analysed, either IP4 
(3 cases) or E (3 cases). Genome count (GC) values ranged between 20 
and 443/m2 for IP4 and 49–714/m2 for E. 
With regard to the 6 PM2.5 samples collected in ambient air inside the 
wagons, 2 gave a positive RT-qPCR signal in one (train L1; sample L1-7) 
or two (train L3; sample L3-6) targets (Table 2). In the first case (L1-7) 
the target gene region identified was IP2, with a figured viral load of 
23.4 GC/m3. In the second case (L3-6) the amplified target gene regions 
were IP2 (18.8 GC/m3) and the envelope protein E (5.6 GC/m3). We 
estimated that, in the worst case situation considering that the RNA load 
would represent equivalent virus with an infectivity potential (which is 
likely to be far from reality), with an infective virion concentration of 23 
RNA copies/m3, a person would inhale on average 1.5 copies of the virus 
in a journey lasting 11 min (average length of a subway journey in 
Barcelona, TMB own data). However, once again we emphasise that in 
our study only fragments of one or two gene targets were identified, not 
an infective virion, and furthermore, even if they were infectious vi-
ruses, it is estimated that only one particle in 10 million would be able to 
produce an infectious cycle. The remaining 4 trains showed no 
contamination (Table 2). In the case of the three air conditioning filters 
analysed by RT-qPCR, none was positive in any target. 
3.2. Bus surface samples before disinfection (group A samples) 
Of the total of 30 swab surface samples taken from call buttons and 
support bars inside buses prior to disinfection (Sample group A), 13 
detected some evidence for the presence of the RNA traces (Table 3). In 
the majority of these cases (9 of 13) only 1 of the 3 target gene regions 
Table 1 
Details of the exposure scenarios simulated.  
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 




90 90 90 90 90 90 
exposure 
scenario 
2 groups of 50 people 2 groups 
of 50 
people 
6 groups of 20 people 6 groups 
of 20 
people 







45 45 15 15 45 45 
Notes 50 people (including 1 infectious 
subject) get-on the bus 
simultaneously and stay on-board for 
45 min, then they get-off the bus and 
other 50 people get-on 
simultaneously and stay on– board 
for 45 min  
20 people (including 1 infectious 
subject) get-on the bus 
simultaneously and stay on-board for 
15 min, then they get-off the bus and 
other 20 people get on 
simultaneously and stay on– board 
for 15 min. Thus every 15 min a new 
20-people group of people get-on the 
bus (6 groups in total)  
65 people (including 1 infectious 
subject) get-on the bus 
simultaneously and stay on-board for 
45 min, then they get-off the bus and 
other 65 people get-on 
simultaneously and stay on– board 
for 45 min  
























For each scenario, 2 sub-scenarios 
were tested considering 2 different 
expiratory activities while standing: 
a) speaking = 3.8 quanta/h; b) oral 




0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54  
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(either IP2 or E) produced a positive result. Of these 9 cases, 4 were IP2 
positives and 5 E positives, but all indicated low or trace amounts of the 
virus (samples A, Table 3). Of the remaining results 3 were positive for 2 
of the targets (IP2 and IP4 or IP4 and E), and one (sample B29) gave 
positive for all three targets (Table 3). Genome count values ranged 
between 14 and 446/m2 for IP2, 9–490/m2 for IP4 and 5–378/m2 for E. 
3.3. Bus surface samples after disinfection (Group B samples) 
The 13 surface swab group B samples taken from buses paired with 
positive group A samples were also selected for RT-PCR analysis. Four of 
these 13 buses had been cleaned using bleach, with the remaining 9 
having been treated with O3, and there had been a time gap of between 
around 2 and 5 h between initial sampling (A) and the second sample 
group (B). The majority of these group B samples (9 out of 13) showed 
total elimination of RNA traces (Table 3). In three samples in group B, 
traces of RNA were still observed (B2, B22, and B24), and in the 
anomalous case of sample B20 a signal for the IP4 and E targets emerged, 
this highlighting the methodological limitation of taking samples A and 
B from adjacent areas (Table 3). 
The fact that a minority of the previously RNA positive samples still 
showed some RNA traces suggests that the disinfection/cleaning pro-
cedure was not totally effective in removing the RNA. In this context, it 
is also possible that the time elapsed between the sampling events before 
and after cleaning/maintenance could have played a role in weakening 
the RNA signals but evidence for this is unclear: Fig. 2 plots the 12 
samples (excluding the anomalous B20 sample) showing time elapsed 
between sampling and type of cleaning employed in each case. Of these 
12 samples the only ones retaining some evidence for the viral RNA had 
been cleaned using ozone. 
As stated above, two methods were utilised for bus disinfection, 8 
applying bleach manually and the remaining 22 using O3 cannons. Of 
the 8 bleach-cleaned buses 4 of them had proved RNA positive prior to 
cleaning, whereas after cleaning all 4 (B3, B8, B10, B30; A to B time 
difference 1 h 55 min to 3 h 43 min) were RNA-free. Of the 22 buses 
cleaned using O3, 9 had proved RNA positive in sample group A taken 
before cleaning. After cleaning only 5 of these 9 were RNA free (samples 
B5, B6, B13, B19, B29). Genome count values ranged between 236/m2 
for IP2, 745/m2 for IP4 and 270–633/m2 for E. 
3.4. Ozone treatment 
A closer examination of the disinfection method using O3 revealed 
room for improvement in the cleaning protocol. The first problem 
encountered was that the cannons themselves did not display O3 levels 
in the bus during operation, so that the operator had no way of verifying 
that the equipment was functioning efficiently. We therefore took the 
precaution of placing two personal O3 monitors (POM) inside the bus to 
verify O3 levels during treatment. One POM was positioned immediately 
behind the O3 cannon inside the driver compartment, while the other 
either in the passenger area just the other side of a plastic screen fitted 
across the width of the bus to protect the driver during the pandemic, or 
at the back of the bus. In two cases O3 levels remained far too low due to 
inefficient functioning of the cannon (Table 4: buses A and D, neither 
Table 2 
Results of the analysis of determination of SARS-CoV-2 by Real-Time RT-PCR in the subway samples using three targets of the virus genome. - negative detection result, 
+ to ++++, positive from traces to very abundant. In brackets the quantification cycle (Cq) values obtained in the positive dilution rendering the highest positivity. D: 
direct (not diluted). GC: Counts of Genome. *Virucidal filter.  
SUBWAY SURFACES 
Sample IP2 IP2 GC/m2 IP4 IP4 GC/m2 E E GC/m2 
L1-1 –  –  +
(41 1/10)  49 
L1-2 –  +
(39 D)  20 
–  
L1-3 –  –  –  
L1-4 –  –  ++
(39 1/10)  132 
L1-5 –  –  –  
L3-1 –  +
(41 1/10)  66 
–  
L3-2 –  –  +++
(37 1/10)  714 
L3-3 –  –  –  
L3-4 –  –  –  
L3-5 –  –  –  
L5-1 –  –  –  
L5-2 –  ++
(38 1/10)  443 
–  
L5-3 –  –  –  
L5-4 –  –  –  
L5-5 –  –  –  
SUBWAY AIR 
Sample: Line-wagoon IP2 IP2 GC/m3 IP4 IP4 GC/m3 E E 
GC/m3 
L1-6 –  –  –  
L1-7 +
(40 1/10)  23.4 
–  –  
L3-6 +
(40 1/10)  18.8 
–  +
(37 D)  5.6 
L3-7 –  –  –  
L5-6 –  –  –  
L5-7 –  –  –  
SUBWAY FILTERS AIR CONDITIONING 
Filter AC IP2  IP4  E  
L1 AC –  –  –  
L3 AC* –  –  –  
L5 AC –  –  –   
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used for swab sampling). 
Another problem emerging from these observations was that even if 
the O3 cannon was functioning correctly O3 levels within the main body 
of the bus remained far lower than in the driver area. The likely main 
reason for this non-uniform ozone distribution is insufficient air circu-
lation and consequent trapping of the gas behind the plastic screen 
protecting the driver. Furthermore, within the transport microenviron-
ment of the bus depot one would expect elevated levels of O3 -consuming 
substances such as volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrous oxide 
(NO) from vehicle exhaust, hydrocarbon evaporation and interior 
degassing of plastics and paints. The latter effect was evident from the 
drastic reduction in O3 as soon as the cannon was turned off, with O3 
dropping to < 1 ppb in just 2 min. 
The TCID50/ml results of the inactivation capacity study of ozone 
treatments using CoV 229E on bus bar surfaces are presented in Table 5. 
The TCID50/ml represents the concentration of infectious viral particles 
of an inoculum that causes the destruction of the cell monolayer in half 
of the replicates of inoculated cultures or with a probability of 0.5. The 
ozone inactivation capacity against CoV 229E was determined by the 
reduction factor, that is, the difference in infectious titer (log10 TCID50/ 
ml) of the control virus not exposed to ozone treatment and the infec-
tious titer obtained after exposure to ozone. The treatment tested must 
demonstrate a decimal logarithmic reduction of at least 4 to verify that it 
has disinfection capacity. Based on the results in Table 5, it is concluded 
that the ozone had no disinfection activity against CoV 229E on bus bar 
surfaces at concentrations of 300 ppb and 600 ppb under the conditions 
tested (exposure time of 20 min at a relative humidity of 60% ± 2). 
Levels of 300 ppb O3 were not reached in the 5 buses studied during the 
nocturnal disinfection (Table 4). 
Table 3 
Results of the analysis of determination of SARS-CoV-2 by RT-PCR in the bus samples using three targets of the virus genome with some positive result. - negative 
detection result, + to ++++, positive from traces to very abundant. In brackets de Cq values obtained in the positive dilution rendering the highest positivity. D: direct 
(not diluted). GC: Counts of Genome. NA: Not applicable.  
BUS SURFACES 
Bus Cleaning method IP2 IP2 GC/m2 IP4 IP4 GC/m2 E E2 GC/m2 
A B A B A B A B A B A B 
B2 O3 – –   – –   ++
(38 1/10) 
++
(38 1/10)  338  342 































– –   – –   











(40 1/10)  48  236 
– ++
(38 1/10)    745 
– ++
(39 1/10)   314 
B22 O3 – –   – –   ++
(38 1/10) 
++
(39 1/10)  378  270 




















B30 NaClO – –   – –   +
39 (D)   27   
BUS AIR 
Sample IP2 IP2 GC/m3 IP4  E  
B32 3.6 +
(40 D)  1.4 
–  –  
B32 4.6 –  –  –  
B32 5.6 –  –  –  
B31 3.6 –  –  –  
B31 4.6 –  –  –  
B31 5.6 –  –  –  
BUS FILTERS AIR CONDITIONING 
Sample IP2  IP4  E E GC/m2 
Dust behind B33 –  –  ++
38 (1/10)  NA 
Dust behind B36 –  –  –  
Dust behind B38 –  –  –  
B33 AC –  –  ++
(38 1/10)  9500 
B36 AC –  –  –  
B38 AC –  –  ++
(39 1/10)  7333 
B23 AC –  –  +
(38 D)  989 
B24 AC –  –  –  
B25 AC –  –  –   
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3.5. Bus ambient air and air conditioning samples 
Of the 6 air samples collected in the buses, one (B32 3.6) gave a weak 
positive result in one of the target genes (IP2), with a calculated viral 
load (again supposing that RNA represents the unlikely worst situation 
of being representative of infective virus load) of 1.44 GC/m3 (Table 3). 
In the case of the six air conditioning filter samples analysed by RT-PCR, 
3 of these (B33, B38, B23) revealed evidence for the presence of the gene 
target E (Table 3). Genome count values ranged between 989 and 9500/ 
m2 for E. The same RNA target was also detected in one of the swab dust 
samples taken from behind the air conditioning filter (bus B33). 
3.6. Modelling reduction of risk of infection by increasing ventilation in a 
bus 
Illustrative examples of quanta concentration in the bus due to the 
presence of an infectious person without wearing a mask and proba-
bilities of infection of the groups of people simultaneously travelling in 
the bus without wearing a mask are reported for all scenarios in Fig. 3. 
The trends clearly highlight that the scenarios with fresh air produce 
significant reduction in the quanta concentrations experienced by the 
travellers and, consequently, their probability of infection. 
The average probability of infection, individual infectious risk, and 
basic reproduction for people exposed in the six scenarios (and corre-
sponding sub-scenarios) simulated are shown in Table 6. The simula-
tions performed showed that for both small and large buses with an 
infectious person speaking a basic reproduction number, R0 > 0.5 was 
estimated when the buses are simultaneously used by large groups of 
people (50 and 65 people for small and large buses, respectively) and no 
fresh air is provided, i.e. when the AER just relies upon the bus air 
leakages and the door opening periods, 0.2/h in our simulations (sce-
nario 1a and 5a, Table 1). For the same scenarios, a R0 < 0.2 can be 
reached when the infectious person is just oral breathing. In fact, for 
scenarios 1 and 5 the individual risks resulted higher than the acceptable 
individual risk (0.1%), whereas it was lower for all the other scenarios 
simulated. 
When fresh air is provided (850 m3/h) high AER values are reached 
both in the small and large buses, thus significantly reducing the R0, 
including where an infectious person is speaking (R0 = 0.11 and 0.10 for 
small and large buses, respectively; scenario 2a and 6a). 
For less crowded conditions, tested for a small bus, a significant 
reduction of R0 was obtained for exposure scenarios with no fresh air 
provided (i.e. scenario 3a, R0 = 0.11 and individual risk equal to 0.09%). 
These results offer insight into how to reduce the risk of airborne 
infection not just for SARS-CoV-2, but also for other airborne infectious 
agents. 
4. Conclusions, recommendations and limitations of the study 
From a total of 82 bus and subway train samples analysed using RT- 
qPCR during this study, 30 showed evidence for the presence of one or 
more of the 3 target RNA gene regions (IP2, IP4, E) of the SARS-CoV-2 
virus. It is important to again emphasise that the detection of frag-
ments of RNA belonging to the SARS-CoV-2 virus does not imply 
infectivity of this pathogen, especially in the context of this study in 
which almost all samples showed positivity only for one or two of the 
three targets under investigation. Most (24) of the 30 positive samples 
yielded evidence for only 1 of the 3 RNA targets. Of the remaining mi-
nority, 4 samples yielded 2 targets, and 2 samples yielded evidence for 
all 3 of IP2, IP4, and E. 
Positive results were more common in surface swab samples from 
Fig. 2. Top: Time difference between collection of group samples A and B in 
bus surfaces indicating if the viral traces were removed, and whether the 
cleaning protocol used bleach or ozone. Bottom: Differences between the 
number of positives (indicating proportion of traces of the virus, as shown in 
Table 3) between group samples A and B for the 3 target gene regions. Sample 
B20 not included in the figure. 
Table 4 
Buses and mean concentration values (ppb) of O3 measured by the 3 measure-
ment equipments by ultraviolet absorption (POM) for the 20 min at each 
location.   
Cleaning period O3 (ppb) 






A 23:10 23:30 9  0.7 
B 23:35 0:05 149  0.7 
C 0:23 0:43 132  0.6 
D 1:49 1:55 10 0.7  
E 1:57 2:17 155 2   
Table 5 
Test of the possible antiviral capacity of ozone on CoV 229E after a 20-minute 
exposure to concentrations of 300 and 600 ppb of ozone and a relative humid-








± IC 95% 
Reduction 
factor ± IC 
95%  
1 4.55 ± 0.26   
Control 2 4.50 ± 0.35 4.49 ± 0.32   
3 4.41 ± 0.35    
1 4.41 ± 0.19   
300 ppb O3 2 4.24 ± 0.30 4.37 ± 0.26 0.12 ± 0.41  
3 4.46 ± 0.29    
1 4.50 ± 0.51   
600 ppb O3 2 4.67 ± 0.30 4.53 ± 0.37 − 0.04 ± 0.49  
3 4.41 ± 0.30    
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support bars (23 out of 58) than in ambient air inside the vehicles (3 out 
of 12). 
Whereas no evidence for RNA traces was found in the small number 
of subway train a/c filters examined, this was not the case for the bus a/c 
filter and dust samples, which showed evidence for SARS-CoV-2 RNA in 
4 out of 9 samples. 
There was a notable decrease in RNA traces detected after the bus 
cleaning/maintenance period. All samples disinfected using bleach 
proved free of the viral genome after cleaning, but this was not the case 
with all buses disinfected using ozone. A limitation of the study was that 
there was significant delay before each bus was returned to the sampling 
team after cleaning and maintenance. Thus, it remains unclear whether 
this decrease or absence of RNA traces was entirely due to the cleaning 
procedures or in some measure to the decay of recently deposited viral 
material over time (in this case 2–5 h between samplings). Our results on 
the effectivity of cleaning with ozone in the laboratory suggest that the 
aforementioned decrease or absence of RNA may have been due to decay 
rather that to the cleaning procedure. Future studies need to investigate 
both possibilities. Another methodological limitation of the study was 
demonstrated by the one sample that showed higher RNA contamination 
after cleaning, raising the possibility of inhomogeneous contamination 
across adjacent sampling surfaces. 
Our findings demonstrate that traces of the SARS-CoV-2 viral 
genome can be detected within public transport vehicles, both on sur-
faces inside the vehicle and in the ambient air. Although in the case of 
this study evidence for concentrations of the viral genome was frag-
mentary, generally weak, and the chances of infectivity considered to be 
extremely low, our data identified a need for tightening up cleaning 
procedures. 
Cleaning procedures in public transport worldwide need to be 
rigorously validated to be effective for virus disinfection/removal, 
especially at times when COVID-19 cases are peaking. If O3 is used, 
concentrations need to be monitored and held at levels known to elim-
inate viral infectivity (not reached in this study). Manual cleaning using 
bleach or other disinfectant agents needs to be done extremely thor-
oughly. The disinfection procedure needs to be not only concentrated on 
the driver area but also include the entire bus. The need for this is 
indicated by the fact that of the 30 buses sampled in our study before and 
after cleaning procedures 4 still yielded traces of the RNA segments after 
cleaning. However, for testing the disinfection efficiency, RNA analysis 
is not enough because this only detects the remains of viral genetic 
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Fig. 3. Quanta concentration in a bus and risk of infection (%) of the groups of exposed people: scenarios 1a-4a (speaking; Table 1).  
Table 6 
Average probability of infection, basic reproduction number, and individual infectious risk for people susceptible people exposed in the six scenarios simulated. a) 
speaking; b) oral breathing.  
Scenario  1 2 3 4 5 6 
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
Individual infectious risk, R (%) 0.72% 0.15% 0.09% 0.02% 0.09% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.48% 0.10% 0.08% 0.02% 
Basic reproduction number, R0 0.85 0.18 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.62 0.13 0.10 0.02  
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procedures should be validated in virology laboratories using cultivated 
coronaviruses and registering any residual infectivity of these after the 
cleaning protocol has being applied. Using this approach, for example, 
our pilot study on disinfection capacity suggests that under O3 concen-
trations of 600 ppb at 60% relative humidity, disinfection of surfaces 
was very inefficient. 
Regarding the evaluation of the risk by modelling there is an unac-
ceptable risk for both small and large buses with full occupancy in the 
case of natural ventilation. In the case of reduced occupancy (20 people 
for exposure time of 15 min) the risk can be calculated as acceptable. 
The best risk reduction is achieved by applying forced ventilation which 
in our model succeeded in producing acceptable results for both small 
and large buses with full occupancy and even with an infected subject 
speaking. The use of masks has not been modelled, but they are known 
to lower the risk as they decrease the emitted quanta (e.g. Leung et al., 
2020) from the potentially infectious passenger. 
As the COVID-19 pandemic has progressed, so urban commuter 
behaviour has changed as individuals adapt to the new reality and learn 
how best to minimise their exposure to viral infection. Correctly fitted 
face masks are by now obligatory on public transport, and people are 
increasingly aware that remaining silent whilst travelling is likely to 
reduce the risk of aerosol transmission. Transport companies are simi-
larly developing new strategies to protect their passengers and staff, and 
in this context we encourage them to widen the availability of hydro-
alcoholic gels, operate remote door opening so that fewer fomite sur-
faces need to be touched by passengers, work to maintain a high 
frequency of service to reduce crowding, and encourage avoidance of 
peak hour travel. Most of all, we recommend close attention to be paid to 
ventilation systems, increasing the forced ventilation rate and the 
introduction of external air wherever possible (evaluating the result by 
using CO2 sensors) and improving filtration systems. Such approaches, 
combined with the application of rigorously effective cleaning and 
disinfection protocols to reduce the risk of fomite transmission, will not 
only act to suppress potential infection but also help to rebuild confi-
dence in the general public regarding the use of urban transport in times 
of viral pandemic. 
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